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Abstract
We consider two-player iterated survival games in which players may switch from a more cooperative behavior
to a less cooperative one at some step of the game. Payoffs are survival probabilities and lone individuals
have to finish the game on their own. We explore the potential of these games to support cooperation,
focusing on the case in which each single step is a Prisoner’s Dilemma. We find that incentives for or against
cooperation depend on the number of defections at the end of the game, as opposed to the number of steps
in the game. Broadly, cooperation is supported when the survival prospects of lone individuals are relatively
bleak. Specifically, we find three critical values or cutoffs for the loner survival probability which, in concert
with other survival parameters, determine the incentives for or against cooperation. One cutoff determines
the existence of an optimal number of defections against a fully cooperative partner, one determines whether
additional defections eventually become disfavored as the number of defections by the partner increases, and
one determines whether additional cooperations eventually become favored as the number of defections by
the partner increases. We obtain expressions for these switch-points and for optimal numbers of defections
against partners with various strategies. These typically involve small numbers of defections even in very
long games. We show that potentially long stretches of equilibria may exist, in which there is no incentive
to defect more or cooperate more. We describe how individuals find equilibria in best-response walks among
strategies, and establish that evolutionary stability requires there be just one such equilibrium. Otherwise,
equilibria are not protected against invasion by strategies with fewer defections.
1. Introduction
In a two-player iterated survival game, individuals may or may not survive each step and an individual
whose partner has died must continue alone (Eshel and Weinshall, 1988). It is a game against Nature
(Lewontin, 1961) such as when individuals have to fend off repeated attacks by a predator (Garay, 2009;
De Jaegher and Hoyer, 2016) or face other sorts of adversity (Emlen, 1982; Harms, 2001; Smaldino et al.,
2013; De Jaegher, 2019). These may include harsh physical conditions. As Darwin (1859, p. 69) had
noted: “When we reach the Arctic regions, or snow-capped summits, or absolute deserts, the struggle for
life is almost exclusively with the elements.” Observing animals living together under harsh physical and
biological conditions, Kropotkin (1902) suggested that mutual aid is all but inevitable in evolution. Iterated
survival games are a simple way to model these scenarios, and they do show that, when the prospects for lone
individuals are not great, self-sacrificing cooperative behaviors can be strongly favored (Eshel and Weinshall,
1988; Eshel and Shaked, 2001; Garay, 2009; Wakeley and Nowak, 2019).
We consider iterated survival games of fixed length n. We assume that there are two possible single-step
strategies or behaviors, which we call C and D. The probability an individual lives through a single step
is given by Table 1, and the game is symmetric in the sense that both players receive payoffs (live or die
in each step) according to this matrix. The choice of labels C and D coincides with an assumption, a > d,
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that individuals in CC pairs fare better than individuals in DD pairs. Total payoffs, which are overall
survival probabilities, accrue multiplicatively across the n steps. These depend on the overall strategies of
individuals, which are fixed strings of Cs and Ds. We ask whether it might be advantageous to switch from
a more cooperative behavior (C) to a less cooperative behavior (D) at some step of the game.
Partner
C D Ø
Individual
C a b a0
D c d a0
Table 1: The single-step payoff (a, b, c, d or a0) in a symmetric two-player survival game is the probability of survival of an
individual when the individual and partner have specified single-step strategies, either C or D, or when the individual is playing
alone because the partner has died (Ø). The loner survival probability, a0, does not depend on the individual’s strategy.
From the standpoint of behavioral biology or mathematical ecology, this is a phenomenological rather
than a mechanistic model (Geritz and Kisdi, 2012). It is described plainly in terms of the relative survival
of types in different combinations, and skirts any details about ‘who helps whom achieve what’ (Rodrigues
and Kokko, 2016). Survival is an obviously crucial kind of utility for individuals, which also combines in
various ways with fertility to produce evolutionary fitness (Argasinski and Broom, 2013). Here, when we
address evolutionary stability, we assume there are no differences in fertility. The principal assumptions we
make are that the single-step payoffs (a, b, c, d, a0) are fixed for the entire game, and that survival outcomes
are statistically independent both in different steps and for different players in a single step. The consequent
multiplicative accrual of payoffs turns relatively mild single-step games into mortally challenging iterated
games as n increases. This naturally produces strong interdependence between individuals, which is known
to favor cooperation and is purposely assumed in other models (Roberts, 2005).
When both players are present, then depending on the magnitudes of a versus c and b versus d, each
step will fall into one of the four well-known classes of symmetric two-player games. Ignoring the possibility
that some payoffs might be equal: a < c and b < d defines the class of games represented by the Prisoner’s
Dilemma (Tucker, 1950; Rapoport and Chammah, 1965); a > c and b < d defines the class represented
by the Stag Hunt (Skyrms, 2004); a < c and b > d defines the class represented by the Hawk-Dove game
(Maynard Smith and Price, 1973; Maynard Smith, 1978); and a > c and b > d defines the class which was
recently dubbed the Harmony Game (De Jaegher and Hoyer, 2016). In the case of the Prisoner’s Dilemma,
a corresponds to the “reward” payoff, b to the “sucker’s” payoff, c to the “temptation” payoff, and d to the
“punishment” payoff (Rapoport and Chammah, 1965).
Wakeley and Nowak (2019) considered individuals with constant strategies (all-C or all-D) and studied
how the relative frequency of the cooperative type changes over time in a well-mixed population due to
differential death in the two-player iterated survival game. Depending especially on the number of iterations
n and the loner survival probability a0, the n-step game may be of a different type than the single-step
game, with obvious implications for the evolution of cooperation. For example, if n is large and a0 is small,
the n-step game may be a Harmony Game even if the single-step game is a Prisoner’s Dilemma. Then
cooperation is favored despite the fact that it seems better to defect in any given step. On the other hand,
if a0 is large, the n-step game may favor all-D even if the single-step game is a Harmony Game.
Here we study the problem of optimal strategy choice for a broader range of n-step strategies, specifically
ones which switch from C to D at some step of the game. Strategy Si plays D for the final i steps of the
game (and C for the first n − i steps) where i can range from 0 to n. Thus, S0 is all-C and Sn is all-D.
We study the general case of an Sj individual with an Si partner, and ask whether there is an advantage to
increasing or decreasing j depending on the other six parameters (a, b, c, d, a0, n). We are interested in the
presence of optima, for which there is no incentive for the individual to increase or decrease the number of
defections. We find critical values of a0 which determine the strategy choice of individuals. Broadly, if a0
is large, then all-D is the only optimum, whereas if a0 is small, then a single intermediate optimum or a
stretch of intermediate optima may exist. For moderate a0, is it also possible that no strategies are optimal,
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that instead incentives exist both to increase and to decrease the number of defections.
We focus primarily on the case where the single step game is a Prisoner’s Dilemma. Comprehensive
treatment of this case uncovers an unexpected array of possible behaviors. With reference to questions
about the incentives for cooperation, our results illustrate that when individuals depend very strongly on
their partners, the motivation to defect or otherwise be non-cooperative may be dramatically less than is
typically understood from the analysis of standard models of repeated games with additive payoffs.
2. Markov model of individual survival and preliminary calculations
The survival game is symmetric, so we can focus on one player, nominally the individual of Table 1. The
individual is in one of three possible situations: alive with a partner, alive without a partner or dead. We
use a Markov chain to model transitions among these three states. The probabilities of surviving to the
next round are given by Table 1, symmetrically for both players, and players live or die independently of
one another other in each step of the game. The chain is non-homogenous because transition probabilities
depend on the strategies of the individual and the partner. There are four possible pairs of single-step
strategies for the individual (listed first) and the partner (listed second) when both are present—CC, DC,
CD, and DD—and we use these to index four corresponding single-step transition matrices. We use Ø to
denote that one of the players has died and ∗ as a placeholder for the partner when the individual has died.
The game always starts with two players, but then changes state randomly according to these matrices.

CC CØ Ø∗
CC a2 a(1− a) 1− a
CØ 0 a0 1− a0
Ø∗ 0 0 1
 = ACC (1)

DC DØ Ø∗
DC bc c(1− b) 1− c
DØ 0 a0 1− a0
Ø∗ 0 0 1
 = ADC (2)

CD CØ Ø∗
CD bc b(1− c) 1− b
CØ 0 a0 1− a0
Ø∗ 0 0 1
 = ACD (3)

DD DØ Ø∗
DD d2 d(1− d) 1− d
DØ 0 a0 1− a0
Ø∗ 0 0 1
 = ADD (4)
The second and third rows of all four matrices are identical due to our assumption of a single loner
survival probability regardless of strategy, and because the state Ø∗ is absorbing for an individual. The
transitions described by the first rows of the matrices are more complex because they involve two events, one
for the individual and one for the partner. Although payoffs are awarded simultaneously to both players in
determining the transition probabilities in the first rows, this two-fold structure lends itself to depiction as
an extensive form of the single-step game between two players (von Neumann, 1928; Kuhn, 1953; Cressman,
2005). This is illustrated in Fig. 1 and underscores the strong dependence between players in an iterated
survival game. Figure 1 is also a probability tree diagram because the transition probabilities in the first
rows in (1) through (4) can be obtained by multiplying probabilities associated with the arrows.
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Figure 1: Two-event decomposition of a single step in the iterated survival game when both players are present, illustrating
Individual-Partner dependence. The diagram can be used to compute the first-rows transition probabilities in the matrices in
(1) through (4) by replacing I and P with strategies C or D then assigning probabilities to the arrows.
An individual with a partner may die, in which case the game is over for the individual regardless of what
happens to the partner. This event is represented by the first down-arrow in Fig. 1. Having a large survival
probability when the partner is present is the only protection against this fate for the individual. Here, the
usual comparisons of a versus c and b versus d describe the consequence of switching strategies against a
partner with a given strategy. But the future state of the individual also depends on what happens to the
partner. If the partner dies (second down-arrow in Fig. 1), the individual ends up alone and will be subject
to the loner survival probability in every remaining step of the game.
The only way to remain in state one of the Markov chain is for both players to survive (both up-arrows
in Fig. 1). The probability of this combined event is given by the upper-left or (1,1) entries in each matrix,
which depend on the strategies of both players. Thus, the consequences of switching strategies will also
depend on the comparisons of a2 versus bc and bc versus d2. This can be understood in terms of the number
of cooperators in each possible pair of single-step strategies. Switching from D to C against a D partner
changes the number of cooperators in the pair from zero to one, and switching from D to C against a C
partner changes it from one to two. The inclusion of the first cooperator in a pair has effect bc− d2 whereas
the inclusion of a second cooperator has effect a2 − bc. Then, for example, an individual who suffers a cost
b − d < 0 in a Prisoner’s Dilemma might also enjoy the benefit of not having to survive alone, if it is also
true that bc− d2 > 0.
The series of single-step strategies in the game between an individual with n-step strategy S
(n)
j and a
partner with n-step strategy S
(n)
i , which we write simply as Sj and Si, may be depicted as
Sj = CCC . . . C︸ ︷︷ ︸
n−j steps
DDD . . .D︸ ︷︷ ︸
j−i steps
DDD . . .D︸ ︷︷ ︸
i steps
Si =
︷ ︸︸ ︷
CCC . . . C
︷ ︸︸ ︷
CCC . . . C
︷ ︸︸ ︷
DDD . . .D
(5)
for i, j ∈ [0, n] and j ≥ i. Our goal is to understand the overall survival of Sj when paired with Si for any
given (i, j). Any such game can be partitioned into three phases: both players having strategy C, one C
and one D, and both D. The ordered series of these will determine the overall transition matrix. For the
example in (5), we have the product An−jCC A
j−i
DCA
i
DD.
We employ the following decomposition—exemplified by the case CC, when both players having strategy
C—in order to compute the powers of the four matrices.
ACC =

a2 a(1− a) 1− a
0 a0 1− a0
0 0 1

=

1 a(1− a) 1
0 a0 − a2 1
0 0 1


a2 0 0
0 a0 0
0 0 1


1 a(a−1)a0−a2
a−a0
a0−a2
0 1a0−a2
−1
a0−a2
0 0 1
 . (6)
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The diagonal elements in the middle matrix in (6) and in ACC itself are the eigenvalues of ACC . The two
outer matrices in (6) are the inverses of each other. For any k = 0, 1, 2, . . ., we have
AkCC =

1 a(1− a) 1
0 a0 − a2 1
0 0 1


a2k 0 0
0 ak0 0
0 0 1


1 a(a−1)a0−a2
a−a0
a0−a2
0 1a0−a2
−1
a0−a2
0 0 1
 (7)
=

a2k a(1− a)ak0−a2ka0−a2 1− a2k − a(1− a)
ak0−a2k
a0−a2
0 ak0 1− ak0
0 0 1
 . (8)
Applying the same technique to ADC , ACD and ADD we obtain
AkDC =

(bc)k c(1− b)ak0−(bc)ka0−bc 1− (bc)k − c(1− b)
ak0−bck
a0−bc
0 ak0 1− ak0
0 0 1
 (9)
AkCD =

(bc)k b(1− c)ak0−(bc)ka0−bc 1− (bc)k − b(1− c)
ak0−bck
a0−bc
0 ak0 1− ak0
0 0 1
 (10)
AkDD =

d2k d(1− d)ak0−d2ka0−d2 1− d2k − d(1− d)
ak0−d2k
a0−d2
0 ak0 1− ak0
0 0 1
 . (11)
With these preliminary calculations, we can determine the n-step payoff of Sj versus Si, which will be the
focus of our analysis. We call this payoff A(Sj ;Si) and note that it is equal to the probability the individual
with strategy Sj is still alive after the n steps of the game. For the case j ≥ i, we have
A(Sj ;Si) = (A
n−j
CC A
j−i
DCA
i
DD)(1,1) + (A
n−j
CC A
j−i
DCA
i
DD)(1,2)
= a2(n−j)(bc)j−id2i + a(1− a)aj0
an−j0 − a2(n−j)
a0 − a2
+ c(1− b)a2(n−j)ai0
aj−i0 − (bc)j−i
a0 − bc + d(1− d)a
2(n−j)(bc)j−i
ai0 − d2i
a0 − d2 . (12)
For the case where j ≤ i, we get the symmetric result in b and c, as well as in i and j,
A(Sj ;Si) = (A
n−i
CC A
i−j
CDA
j
DD)(1,1) + (A
n−i
CC A
i−j
CDA
j
DD)(1,2)
= a2(n−i)(bc)i−jd2j + a(1− a)ai0
an−i0 − a2(n−i)
a0 − a2
+ b(1− c)a2(n−i)aj0
ai−j0 − (bc)i−j
a0 − bc + d(1− d)a
2(n−i)(bc)i−j
aj0 − d2j
a0 − d2 . (13)
Note that each of the four terms in (12) and (13) correspond to a particular type of sub-event: the first
is when the partner also stays alive during the whole game, the remaining three are when the partner dies
either when both players have strategy C, when one has C and one has D, or when both have D.
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3. Playing with a fully cooperative partner
We begin with the example of an individual with strategy Sj and a partner with strategy S0, first in
general then focusing on the Prisoner’s Dilemma. We are motivated by the fact that when the single-step
game is a Prisoner’s Dilemma, playing D in the final step of an n-step game will always increase the survival
probability of an individual. If payoffs accrued additively as in the classical repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma
(Rapoport and Chammah, 1965; Axelrod, 1984) then by backward induction the same logic would apply to
every preceding step of the game. Seeing an uninterrupted sequence of increased chances of survival, an all-C
individual facing an all-C partner would switch to all-D. But payoffs do not accrue additively in an iterated
survival game. We may infer from the results of Wakeley and Nowak (2019) that increasing numbers of
defections may eventually be disfavored even against a fully cooperative partner, in particular if the partner
were to die and the cost of having to survive the rest of the game alone was too great.
Here and throughout, we would like to know what strategy an individual might adopt to maximize
survival given the partner’s strategy and the specific game parameters (a, b, c, d, a0, n). In Section 3.1, we
illustrate differences among the four well-known classes of games and highlight the importance of the loner
survival probability a0 in determining broad patterns of strategy choice in iterated survival games. Our
focused analysis in Section 3.2 addresses the question just raised, about how far a notion like backward
induction might carry over to iterated survival games in which the single-step game between two players
is a Prisoner’s Dilemma. Section 3.2 also introduces the analytical approaches we will apply to the more
complicated case of Sj against Si in Section 4 and Section 5.
The n-step payoff, or probability of survival, of Sj against S0 is obtained by putting i = 0 in (12):
A(Sj ;S0) =
a− a2
a0 − a2 a
n
0 + a
2n
[
a0 − c
a0 − bc
(
bc
a2
)j
+
(
c− bc
a0 − bc −
a− a2
a0 − a2
)(a0
a2
)j]
. (14)
Thus, A(Sj ;S0) depends on three individual survival probabilities (a, b, c), as well as on the pair survival
probabilities (a2, bc) and the loner survival probability (a0) which are eigenvalues of the single-step matrices
in (1) and (2). It does not depend on d because there are no steps in which both players use strategy D.
The dependence on n is simple: A(Sj ;S0) tends to zero as n tends to infinity. Surviving longer is always less
likely. Conveniently for our purposes, A(Sj ;S0) depends on j only through the terms in the brackets, which
do not include n. We focus on these terms and treat n implicitly, noting of course that j ≤ n. Because
the terms in brackets may increase as j increases, it should be noted that A(Sj ;S0) is a probability—it can
never exceed 1—and that if j = n and n tends to infinity, A(Sj ;S0) tends to zero.
We wish to know the value of j ∈ [0, n] which maximizes the survival probability of the individual for a
given parameters (a, b, c, a0). Although j is discrete, in order to find an optima we treat (14) as a continuous
function of j. Three cases can occur, because there is at most one change in sign of the slope. The maximum
can be reached when j = 0, which would happen for example when a2 > a0 > c. Then the fully cooperative
behavior has the greatest chance of survival, no matter how many rounds are being played. Alternatively,
the supremum of the function may be in the limit j → ∞. Then, for large enough n, the best j would be
n. In this case Sn, or all-D, would have the greatest chance of survival against S0. A third case is that the
function has a maximum at some intermediate value, specifically at
jopt =
ln
[(
a(1−a)(a0−bc)
(a0−c)(a0−a2) −
c(1−b)
a0−c
)
ln ( a0
a2
)
ln ( bc
a2
)
]
ln
(
bc
a0
) (15)
which exists when the argument of the logarithm in the numerator is positive. In this case, there could be an
intermediate step in the game which gives the greatest benefit of switching from C to D. The integer-valued
optimum j would be one of the integers on either side of the real-valued jopt,
Jopt =

bjoptc
or
djopte
(16)
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provided that n > jopt. If n ≤ jopt, then Sn would again be the best strategy against S0. It is remarkable
that the optimal j does not depend on n in this third case, as long as n remains larger than jopt.
3.1. Comparison of the four types of games
Figure 2 shows A(Sj ;S0) as a function of j in a game of length n = 50 for examples of the four classes
of games, when the loner survival probability is either small (Fig. 2A) or large (Fig. 2B). The other payoffs
(a, b, c, d) are the same in both panels. For the example Prisoner’s Dilemma, these payoffs (a = 0.97, b = 0.94,
c = 0.99, d = 0.95) are a linear transformation of the classic payoffs (R = 3, S = 0, T = 5, P = 1) of Axelrod
(1984). For all four games in Fig. 2A the relationship of the eigenvalues is a2 > bc > a0. In Fig. 2B it is
a0 > a
2 > bc. Again, we are interested in whether the highest survival occurs at one or the other extreme,
j = 0 or j = n, or at some intermediate Jopt. An optimal intermediate strategy exists in these examples
only for the Prisoner’s Dilemma and the Hawk Dove game with small a0 (Fig. 2A). When a0 is the smallest
eigenvalue, there is a high cost to a player being alone for a long stretch. The optimal strategy balances
the increased chance of paying this cost against the increase in survival from switching from C to D in
the Prisoner’s Dilemma and the Hawk Dove game. If, as in the Stag Hunt and Harmony game in Fig. 2A,
switching from C to D does not directly increase survival, then S0 (all-C) is best.
On the other hand, when a0 is large, a lone individual may have an advantage. In Fig. 2B, a0 is the
largest payoff and therefore also the largest eigenvalue (a0 > a
2 > bc). For all four example games, if j is
large enough, the term in brackets in (14) will be increasing in j. A less-cooperative strategy is advantageous
in this case provided the game is long enough. However, the Harmony game and the Stag Hunt both have
c < a, so switching from C to D once or a few times directly decreases individual survival causing minima
of survival at an intermediate j for both these games. It is only for larger values of j that the partner’s
even lower survival (b < a and b < c for all four example games in Fig. 2) allows the individual to see the
benefits of the high loner payoff. The Prisoner’s Dilemma and the Hawk Dove game do not show this dip in
survival for small j because they both have c > a. In addition, note that the advantages of increasing j may
depend strongly on the partner’s survival probability. For example, changing b so that b > a in the example
Harmony game in Fig. 2B would make increasing j disadvantageous for the individual.
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Figure 2: The probability of survival of an individual who switches strategy from C to D for the last j steps in of an iterated
survival game of length n = 50 against an all-C partner. In A the loner survival probability is small, a0 = 0.8, and in B the
loner survival probability is large, a0 = 0.99. Colors denote examples of the four possible kinds of games: blue is a Prisoner’s
Dilemma (a = 0.97, b = 0.94, c = 0.99, d = 0.95), orange is a Harmony game (a = 0.97, b = 0.95, c = 0.96, d = 0.94), red is a
Stag Hunt (a = 0.97, b = 0.94, c = 0.96, d = 0.95), light blue is a Hawk Dove game (a = 0.97, b = 0.95, c = 0.98, d = 0.94).
Figure 2 reveals some key features and some complexities of strategy choice in iterated survival games.
The four-fold classification of games based on the comparison of a to c and b to d, together with the rough
criteria of large versus small a0 is not enough to determine the potential advantages of switching strategies
from C to D at some point in the game. The order of the eigenvalues (a2, bc, d2, a0) is crucial. The example
games in Figure 2 all have a2 > bc > d2, but it could be otherwise. For some games, we might have
a2 > d2 > bc and for others bc > a2 > d2. The assumption that C is the more cooperative and D the
less cooperative strategy, hence a > d, guarantees that a2 > d2. But in all cases, a0 could be anywhere in
the order of eigenvalues. In what follows, we focus on the classic challenge to cooperation, the Prisoner’s
Dilemma of Tucker (1950) and Rapoport and Chammah (1965), which is a restricted version of what we
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have been calling the Prisoner’s Dilemma class of games. Our aim is to determine in detail when a late
defection might be optimal or when an early one would be better, depending especially on the magnitude of
the loner survival probability, a0.
3.2. Defection against a fully cooperative partner in the Prisoner’s Dilemma
We base our detailed analysis on the payoff difference
A(Sj ;S0)−A(S0;S0) = a2n
[
a0 − c
a0 − bc
(
bc
a2
)j
+
(
c(1− b)
a0 − bc −
a(1− a)
a0 − a2
)(a0
a2
)j
− a0 − a
a0 − a2
]
. (17)
When this difference is positive, there is incentive for an individual (currently playing all-C against an all-C
partner) to switch strategies and defect for the final j rounds of the game. When it is negative, the individual
is better off sticking with strategy S0 or switching from Sj to S0. The j for which this difference is the largest
will be the optimal number of end-game defections given a fully cooperative partner.
As in (14), there is a separation of n and j. Preliminarily, we may note that (17) is bounded above
by +1 and below by −1, and that it approaches zero as n → ∞ for any fixed j. Further, the same two
exponential terms are present within the brackets, which will increase, decrease or remain constant as j
increases depending on the ratios of eigenvalues, bc/a2 and a0/a
2. So, again, the slope changes sign at most
once. It is straightforward to compute A(S0;S0)−A(S0;S0) = 0 and A(S1;S0)−A(S0;S0) = a2n(c−a) > 0.
Then for the Prisoner’s Dilemma (i.e. with c > a), the payoff difference increases with j when j is small.
The question is whether it continues to increase or reaches a peak and starts to decrease as j grows.
To answer this question, we make use of the classical assumptions of the Prisoner’s Dilemma, described
for example by Rapoport and Chammah (1965, p. 34). Specifically,
c > a > d > b (18)
a > (b + c)/2 =⇒ a2 > bc. (19)
The broader class of games which includes this Prisoner’s Dilemma is defined just by c > a and d > b.
The assumption a > d in (18) guarantees that a2 > d2, which means that the survival probability of the
pair is higher when both players cooperate than when both defect. The additional criterion a2 > bc in (19)
means that pairs survive better when both players cooperate than when just one player cooperates. This
is often true: with (a, b, c, d) sampled uniformly at random, 90% of survival games which satisfy (18) also
have a2 > bc (Wakeley and Nowak, 2019). Meeting this criterion fixes the ratio bc/a2 in (17) to be strictly
less than one. The parameter a0 remains free, ranging between 0 and 1, and the assumptions so far do not
determine the relationship between bc and d2.
With the ratio bc/a2 < 1, then if it is also true that a0 < a
2, both exponential terms in (17) will be
decreasing in j and will eventually go to zero. At some point as j increases, assuming n is large enough,
the difference A(Sj ;S0)−A(S0;S0) will turn negative and converge to the constant −a2n(a0− a)/(a0− a2).
Too many defections will ultimately hurt the player because the loner survival probability is small. Again,
defecting just once at the end of the game is always favored because c > a. Therefore an optimal strategy
SJopt will exist for some integer Jopt, given by (15) and (16). But if n is not large enough, then j will always
be less than this optimum and the best strategy against S0 will be Sn.
Instead if a0 > a
2, then the difference A(Sj ;S0)−A(S0;S0) will eventually be dominated by the middle
term in (17). Depending on the sign of this term, A(Sj ;S0)−A(S0;S0) will be increasing or decreasing when
j is large. As there is at most one change in sign of the slope and the initial slope is positive, the difference
A(Sj ;S0)−A(S0;S0) will either increase for all j or it will start decreasing at some point as j grows. Either
the best strategy is complete defection or there exists an optimal intermediate strategy. The first occurs if
and only if c(1−b)a0−bc −
a(1−a)
a0−a2 > 0, such that the middle term in (17) is positive. This induces a cutoff for a0
as it varies between a2 and 1. There is a shift in the behavior of A(Sj ;S0)− A(S0;S0) as j increases, from
having an intermediate optimum to always increasing, specifically at
a∗0 =
c− a
c− a + a2 − bca
2 +
a2 − bc
c− a + a2 − bca. (20)
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The cutoff a∗0 is the largest value of a0 such that full defection might not be favored (i.e. there is a finite
optimum j) against a fully cooperative partner. Again, if n ≤ jopt, then full defection would still be the best
strategy, even if a0 < a
∗
0. But if a0 > a
∗
0, then full defection will always favored, for any n.
The two survival differences which determine the coefficients of a2 and a in (20) can be understood with
reference to Fig. 1 and (1) and (2). The first, c− a > 0, is the classic change in payoff for defecting against
a cooperative partner, which here is the difference in the single-step survival probability of the individual
regardless of what happens to the partner. The second, a2−bc > 0, expresses as a positive term the difference
in the probability that both the individual and the partner survive. It is a single-step cost in pair survival
but may be either a cost or a benefit to the individual depending on the values of a0 and n. The coefficients
in (20) sum to one, so the cutoff a∗0 is an average falling between a
2 and a. Note that, in view of the first
rows of ACC and ADC in (1) and (2), we may rewrite the shared denominator of these coefficients as the
difference in the single-step probability of ending up alone, c(1 − b) − a(1 − a) > 0. Switching from C to
D against an all-C partner increases the chance of winding up alone in every subsequent step of the game,
which again may be either a cost or a benefit to the individual.
The cutoff a∗0 is closer to a
2, and therefore smaller, when the benefit in individual survival, c− a, is large
relative to the cost in pair survival, a2− bc. When this is true, even a fairly small value of the loner survival
probability a0 cannot prevent Sn from being the best strategy against S0. On the other hand, a
∗
0 is closer to
a, and therefore larger, when the cost in pair survival is relatively big. When this is true, there may be an
intermediate optimum strategy even when the loner survival probability is fairly large. Taking derivatives of
a∗0 provides some intuition about the effects of changing specific parameters, when other parameters are held
constant. As long as the assumptions in (18) continue to be met, a∗0 increases as a increases, but decreases
when either b or c increases. In addition, if b increases and c decreases, together so that bc approaches a2,
then a∗0 will decrease toward a
2.
So far, we have considered two possibilities: a0 < a
2 and a0 > a
2. In the first case, a2 is the largest
eigenvalue. Here a pair of cooperators survives a single step of the game better than any other pair and better
than a lone individual. Both terms which depend on j in (17) decrease to zero and the payoff difference
A(Sj ;S0) − A(S0;S0) converges to a finite, negative constant, so there exists an optimum number of end-
game defections, Jopt in (16). In the second case (a0 > a
2), a lone individual survives a single step better
than any pair of individuals. But even when this is true, it is not always advantageous to increase the
number of end-game defections. It is only when a0 exceeds a
∗
0, which is larger than a
2, that defecting more
and more is always favored. If a2 < a0 < a
∗
0, there is a Jopt which may be relevant depending on the total
number of steps in the game, n. Note that when a0 = a
∗
0 there is still a growing interest in defecting, but
the dependence on j is different because the middle term in (17) is equal to zero and A(Sj ;S0)−A(S0;S0)
converges to a positive constant, a2n(c− a)/(a2 − bc), as j increases.
In the special case that a2 = a0, we cannot use the results for geometric series which gave (8) through (11).
Here we have
A(Sj ;S0) = a
2n
[
a2 − c
a2 − bc
(
bc
a2
)j
+ (n− j)1− a
a
+
c− bc
a2 − bc
]
(21)
d
dj
A(Sj ;S0) = a
2n
[
a2 − c
a2 − bc ln
(
bc
a2
)(
bc
a2
)j
− 1− a
a
]
. (22)
As bc < a2 < c, the derivative will ultimately become negative, so there will be some optimal point of
defection. Thus, a0 = a
2 is not pathological and belongs to the case a2 < a0 < a
∗
0. For technical reasons we
have distinguished three cases — a0 < a
2, a2 ≤ a0 < a∗0 and a∗0 ≤ a0 — but the important point is whether
a Jopt may exist or not, and for this we have just two cases: a0 < a
∗
0 and a
∗ ≤ a0. Figure 3 shows the payoff
difference, (17) as function of j, for examples of these two cases.
We turn now to the question of how jopt and Jopt depend on a0 when a0 < a
∗
0. Because larger a0 indicates
a smaller cost of being alone, it is intuitive that both quantities should increase with a0. Examination of
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Figure 3: A(Sj ;S0)−A(S0;S0) as a function of j for two different Prisoner’s Dilemmas, illustrating the dependence on a0. For
both: a = 0.97, b = 0.94, c = 0.99, d = 0.95 as in Fig. 2, for which a2 = 0.9409 and a∗0 ' 0.9508. In blue: a0 = 0.98 > a∗0 and
the difference diverges. In orange: a0 = 0.9 < a2 and the difference starts to decrease after Jopt = 16.
jopt in (15) when a0 is close to either of its extremes, 0 or a
∗
0, gives
jopt ∼
a0→0
ln
(
1−a
a
ln
(
1
a0
)
ln ( bc
a2
)
)
ln
(
1
a0
) →
a0→0
0 (23)
and
jopt ∼
a0→a∗0
ln
 a∗0−a0
(a∗0−c)(a∗0−a2)
ln
(
a∗0
a2
)
ln ( bc
a2
)

ln
(
bc
a∗0
) →
a0→a∗0
+∞. (24)
Figure 4 shows jopt as a function of a0, suggesting that both jopt and Jopt are increasing functions of a0.
For Jopt, using (16) and the fact that A(S1;S0)−A(S0;S0) = a2n(c− a) > 0, we have
Jopt →
a0→0
1 (25)
and
Jopt →
a0→a∗0
+∞. (26)
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Figure 4: The optimal, real-valued point of defection jopt increases without bound as a0 approaches a∗0, for the same single-step
Prisoner’s Dilemma game in Fig. 3, i.e. with a = 0.97, b = 0.94, c = 0.99, d = 0.95.
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To prove that Jopt increases with a0 for a0 < a
∗
0, we note that
Jopt = 1 + max {j/A(Sj+1;S0) ≥ A(Sj ;S0)} . (27)
Therefore, it is enough to prove that, for any given j, if A(Sj+1;S0) ≥ A(Sj ;S0) for some a0 then it is also
true for any larger a0. In the special case j = 0, we have A(S1;S0) ≥ A(S0;S0) for all a0 because in this
case (17) does not depend on a0. Let j be some integer such that n > j ≥ 1. Then we have
(A(Sj+1;S0)−A(Sj ;S0))(a0) = a2(n−j−1)
(
c− a + a2 − bc) aj0 − a2(n−j−1)(a2 − bc)(bc)j
− a2(n−j−1)(a2 − bc)c(1− b)
j−1∑
k=0
(bc)kaj−k−10 (28)
d
da0
(A(Sj+1;S0)−A(Sj ;S0))(a0) = ja2(n−j−1)
(
c− a + a2 − bc) aj−10
− a2(n−j−1)(a2 − bc)c(1− b)
j−2∑
k=0
(j − k − 1)(bc)kaj−k−20 (29)
≥ j
a0
[
a2(n−j−1)
(
c− a + a2 − bc) aj0
− a2(n−j−1)(a2 − bc)c(1− b)
j−2∑
k=0
(bc)kaj−k−10
]
(30)
≥ j
a0
(A(Sj+1;S0)−A(Sj ;S0))(a0) + j
a0
a2(n−j−1)(a2 − bc)(bc)j . (31)
Then since a2 > bc, the last inequality completes the proof. When A(Sj+1;S0)−A(Sj ;S0) ≥ 0 for some a0
it remains positive for any larger a0. With an all-C partner, Jopt increases with a0 < a
∗
0. Beyond this point,
i.e. for a0 ≥ a∗0, we may also say that Jopt is infinite because regardless of n it will always be beneficial to
increase the number of defections.
4. Behavioral equilibria
We now lift the restriction that the partner is fully cooperative, and ask whether there is an incentive
to defect more or to cooperate more when the partner has strategy Si. As the number of possible strategies
{Sj ; j ∈ [0, n]} is finite, there will always be an optimal one against Si. We are interested in identifying
stable strategies, such that the individual cannot increase their probability of survival against a partner who
has the same strategy. Strategy Si is optimal in this sense, and thus a strict Nash equilibrium, when
∀j 6= i, A(Si;Si) > A(Sj ;Si). (32)
Due to (12) and (13), the cases j > i and j < i must be analyzed separately. Note that there may be
many such equilibrium strategies. We will also consider whether these equilibria are evolutionarily stable
strategies, or ESSs, (Maynard Smith and Price, 1973; Thomas, 1985) further satisfying
∀j 6= i, A(Si;Sj) > A(Sj ;Sj). (33)
Equation (33) is a population concept: even if an alternative strategy Sj reaches a frequency where its
self-interaction becomes appreciable, it will not take over the population.
In this section we focus on local equilibria, meaning that the only options open to the individual are to
defect one more time or cooperate one more time. Strategy Si is a locally stable if and only if
A(Si;Si) > A(Si+1;Si) (34)
A(Si;Si) > A(Si−1;Si) (35)
which may be summarized as A(Si;Si) > max(A(Si+1;Si), A(Si−1;Si)). In Section 5, we consider global
properties of the payoff matrix A(Sj ;Si) for all i, j ∈ [0, n].
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4.1. General results
We base our analysis of local stability on the two key differences
A(Si+1;Si)−A(Si;Si) = a2(n−1)
[
(bc− a2) a0 − d
a0 − d2
(
d2
a2
)i
+
(
(a2 − bc) a0 − d
a0 − d2 + c− a
)(a0
a2
)i]
(36)
A(Si−1;Si)−A(Si;Si) = a2(n−1)
[
(bc− d2) a0 − d
a0 − d2
(
d2
a2
)i−1
+
(
(d2 − bc) a0 − d
a0 − d2 + b− d
)(a0
a2
)i−1]
.
(37)
Similar to (17), these two formulas show a separation of i and n. Their signs may depend on i but will not
depend on n. Both formulas are sums of two exponential functions in i, with coefficients that depend on
the game parameters (a, b, c, d, a0). They can change sign at most once. Therefore, the conditions for local
stability in (34) and (35) will each be met—corresponding, respectively, to (36) and (37) being negative—
either for a stretch of i or for no values of i. The set of locally stable i is the intersection of these two
(possibly empty) stretches. In the case of defecting one more time, the stretch may range from 0 to +∞. In
the case of cooperating one more time, it may range from 1 to +∞. Then the locally stable strategies are a
stretch of integers whose boundaries range from 1 to +∞ (which again may be empty) plus possibly 0. For
the smallest i, (36) and (37) reduce to
A(S1;S0)−A(S0;S0) = a2(n−1)(c− a) (38)
A(S0;S1)−A(S1;S1) = a2(n−1)(b− d). (39)
Strategy S0, or all-C, is locally stable if and only if c < a which means that the single-step game is either a
Harmony game or a Stag Hunt (cf. Table 1). As in Section 3, we treat n implicitly in what follows, keeping
in mind that any stretch of equilibria will depend on n in that n fixes the upper boundary of the interval.
Our primary concern is to understand how the stretch of locally stable states depends on the other game
parameters, in particular the loner survival probability a0.
4.2. Focusing on the Prisoner’s Dilemma
Here as in Section 3.2 we focus on the Prisoner’s Dilemma. Thus we use the exact same assumptions,
(18) and (19), that c > a > d > b and a2 > bc. In the following subsections, we first study the incentives (or
disincentives) to either defect more or cooperate more, then consider the overlap of these two sets of results
in order to identify equilibria, and finally turn to questions about evolutionary stability.
4.2.1. Incentives to defect or cooperate more against Si
Under the assumption that the single-step game is a Prisoner’s Dilemma, we have
A(S1;S0)−A(S0;S0) = a2(n−1)(c− a) > 0 (40)
A(S0;S1)−A(S1;S1) = a2(n−1)(b− d) < 0. (41)
This proves that i = 0 is neither a locally stable state nor an ESS when the single-step game is a Prisoner’s
Dilemma. The difference A(Si+1;Si) − A(Si;Si) in (36) starts off positive for small i and will change
sign at most once. We define the real-valued cutoff iD to be the point at which defecting one more time
becomes disadvantageous as i increases. If (36) never changes sign, then iD does not exist and additional
defection is always favored. When i > iD, the strategy Si is a candidate for locally stability. Similarly,
since A(Si−1;Si)−A(Si;Si) in (37) starts off negative for small i and changes sign at most once, we define
iC to be the point at which increased cooperation first becomes advantageous. Here too iC may not exist.
When i < iC , the second criterion for local stability of strategy Si is met. Both criteria are satisfied when
i ∈ [diDe, biCc], but this interval will be empty if diDe > biCc.
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We begin with the case of increasing defection. If a0 < d
2, then A(Si+1;Si) − A(Si;Si) in (36) will
ultimately become negative because the first term inside the brackets will come to dominate as i grows and
this term is negative owing to our assumption that a2 > bc. If a0 > d
2, then (36) will ultimately become
negative if and only if (a2 − bc) a0−da0−d2 + c− a < 0. Analogous to the situation in Section 3.2 with the cutoffs
a∗0 and jopt, here we require
a0 < a
′
0 =
c− a
c− a + a2 − bcd
2 +
a2 − bc
c− a + a2 − bcd (42)
and find an associated cutoff for i
iD =
ln
(
1 + c−aa2−bc
a0−d2
a0−d
)
ln
(
d2
a0
) (43)
which exists if a0 < a
′
0. There is an advantage to defecting one more more time only when i < iD. For larger
i it is disadvantageous. In the special case a0 = d
2, we obtain
A(Si+1;Si)−A(Si;Si) = a2n
[
c− a + (bc− a2)1− d
d
i
](
d2
a2
)i
(44)
which starts off positive for i = 0 then turns negative for some larger i. Thus a0 = d
2 is not a pathological
case but belongs with a0 < d
2 and d2 < a0 < a
′
0. For all a0 < a
′
0, additional defections will eventually be
disadvantageous. Alternatively, if a0 ≥ a′0, an individual with strategy Si has an incentive to defect one
more time against a partner with strategy Si, regardless of the value of i.
Like a∗0 in (20), the cutoff a
′
0 in (42) is an average. Previously i was the number of defections the individual
was considering against and all-C partner. Here i is the fixed number of DD rounds the individual must
face when considering whether to defect one more time against an Si partner. As a result, a
′
0 is an average
falling between d2 and d instead of between a2 and a. However, the coefficients determining where it falls
are the same as before because the individual is making the same switch, from C to D when the partner has
strategy C in that step. By taking derivatives of either coefficient (they sum to one), it can be shown that
a′0 is closer to d when a increases, but is closer to d
2 when either b or c increases or when b and c together
approach a. The effect of d on a′0 is straightforward. For example, if d is small, then a
′
0 will be small and
both the individual and the partner will have low survival in the remaining steps of the game. What (42)
and (43) show is that this can offset the benefit of additional defections. Although the individual may still
see an advantage to increasing defection if a0 is small enough, the advantage will only be realized for i < iD.
Figure 5 illustrates that when a0 is small, iD is small.
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Figure 5: iD is the point above which defecting once more would become disadvantageous. It increases with a0 toward +∞ as
a0 approaches a′0. The parameters here are the same as in Fig. 4 (a = 0.97, b = 0.94, c = 0.99, d = 0.95).
Figure 5 suggests that iD is an increasing function of a0, growing from 0 to +∞ as a0 goes from 0 to
a′0. As before, this fits with intuition about the balance between the benefit of defecting while the partner is
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still alive and the drawback of having to survive alone. The bigger a0 is, the smaller this drawback becomes.
The extremes of iD can be obtained from (43). We find
iD →
a0→0
0 (45)
iD →
a0→a′0
+∞. (46)
To prove that iD is an increasing function of a0, we focus on the point at which defecting one more time
switches from being advantageous to being disadvantageous. This determines the relationship between iD
and a0, namely
A(Si+1;Si)−A(Si;Si) = 0⇔ (bc− a2) a0 − d
a0 − d2 d
2i +
(
(a2 − bc) a0 − d
a0 − d2 + c− a
)
ai0 = 0
⇔ d
2(
1 + c−aa2−bc
a0−d2
a0−d
) 1
i
= a0. (47)
Both i = iD and a0 = d
2 are solutions of (47). The solution a0 = d
2 is true for all i. We want to know
how the other solution depends on a0, and for this we write iD(a0). We use a graphical method depicted
in Fig. 6. Specifically, the two solutions of (47) are the two points at which the diagonal y = a0 and the
curve y = d2
(
1 + c−aa2−bc
a0−d2
a0−d
)−1/i
intersect for a given i. Every one of these curves crosses the diagonal at
a0 = d
2. The other point of intersection depends on i and, for each curve, happens at a0 such that iD(a0)
solves (47). Under the assumptions Eqs (18) and (19), the function d2
(
1 + c−aa2−bc
a0−d2
a0−d
)−1/i
increases with
a0 and, for a given a0 < d
2, it increases with i. Then because these curves are anchored at a0 = d
2, the
other points at which they cross the diagonal, which we call a0(i), must also increase with i. Considering
two values of i, with i1 > i2 > 0, we have
a0 < d
2 ⇒ d
2(
1 + c−aa2−bc
a0−d2
a0−d
) 1
i1
>
d2(
1 + c−aa2−bc
a0−d2
a0−d
) 1
i2
(48)
so that a0(i2) < d
2 ⇒ a0(i1) > a0(i2) and a0(i2) > d2 ⇒ a0(i1) > d2, and
a0 > d
2 ⇒ d
2(
1 + c−aa2−bc
a0−d2
a0−d
) 1
i1
<
d2(
1 + c−aa2−bc
a0−d2
a0−d
) 1
i2
(49)
so that a0(i2) > d
2 ⇒ a0(i1) > a0(i2). Finally, because a0(i) is a positive strictly increasing function, its
reciprocal function iD(a0) is a strictly increasing function, which is what we set out to prove.
Turning now to the case of increasing cooperation, we recall that A(Si−1;Si)−A(Si;Si) in (37) is negative
for the smallest value, i = 1. Based just on this consideration, the stretch of possible local equilibria will
continue until A(Si−1;Si) − A(Si;Si) switches sign and becomes positive at some iC . If iC exists, then for
any larger i it will be advantageous for the individual to cooperate one more time, specifically in that step
of the game when the partner first defects. Then for all i > iC , strategy Si cannot be locally stable, whereas
for i < iC it may be locally stable. We note that if the individual changes strategy from Si to Si−1 against
an Si partner, the pair-survival probability changes from d
2 to bc, and the individual survival probability
changes from d to b. The net effect of the latter is negative (b−d < 0). This direct disadvantage to additional
cooperation may be offset by increased pair survival, but only if bc > d2. Again, the assumptions in (18)
and (19) do not determine the relationship of bd to d2. It turns out that 60% of Prisoner’s Dilemmas defined
by (18) and (19) have bc > d2 (Wakeley and Nowak, 2019).
When bc ≤ d2, the sign of A(Si−1;Si)− A(Si;Si) never changes because the net effect on pair survival,
bc − d2, is at most zero and will not be able to offset the direct, individual disadvantage of cooperating
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Figure 6: Solving (47) graphically means finding the intersection between the diagonal y = a0 in black and one of the curves
in color y = d2
(
1 + c−a
a2−bc
a0−d2
a0−d
)−1/i
for a given i. This is illustrated here for five different values of i and game parameters
a = 0.97 , b = 0.9 , c = 0.99 and d = 0.91. These differ from the parameters in Fig. 5 and previous figures by subtracting 0.04
from b and d, which makes d2 smaller while keeping a′0 close to d, in order to illustrate the curves in the region a0 > d
2.
one more time. In this case iC does not exist, so all strategies are candidates for local stability, the upper
limit being set only by n. When bc > d2, the sign of the payoff difference may change, giving a finite
iC , but this will depend on the loner survival probability. If a0 < d
2, then A(Si−1;Si) − A(Si;Si) will
eventually become positive. The case a0 = d
2 gives the same result, but is necessary again to compute the
difference in probability without using the results for geometric series as we did previously for the condition
on A(Si−1;Si) − A(Si;Si). If a0 > d2 the payoff difference will ultimately become positive if and only if
(bc− d2) a0−da0−d2 + d− b > 0. Overall, additional cooperation is favored when
a0 < a
′′
0 =
d− b
d− b + bc− d2 d
2 +
bc− d2
d− b + bc− d2 d (50)
but only for i greater than
iC = 1 +
ln
(
1 + d−bbc−d2
a0−d2
a0−d
)
ln
(
d2
a0
) . (51)
Even when the loner survival probability is small, it will still be disadvantageous to cooperate one more time
if i < iC . Using an analogous graphical approach to that for iD, it can be shown that iC is an increasing
function of a0 in the interval (0, a
′′
0). Further, we have
iC →
a0→0
1 (52)
iC →
a0→a′′0
+∞. (53)
Intuitively, the larger a0 is, the lower the danger of a long stretch of mutual defection, so the individual is
less inclined to risk a low probability of individual survival (b) in a given step for a greater chance of pair
survival (bc). As a0 approaches a
′′
0 , surviving alone no longer becomes a drawback as i increases.
4.2.2. Stretches of locally stable strategies
The stretch of locally stable strategies is the interval of integers which satisfy the two conditions summa-
rized as A(Si;Si) > max(A(Si+1;Si), A(Si−1;Si)). The interval of integers we are looking for is [diDe, biCc],
which is empty when diDe > biCc. There are three different cases to consider. The first is when d2 ≥ bc, such
that iC does not exist regardless of a0. With an upper limit of n, the integer interval begins as [1, n] when a0
is close to 0, then shrinks to an empty set as a0 increases, because the lower boundary, diDe, grows without
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bound as a0 approaches the cutoff a
′
0 in (42) and does not exist when a0 ≥ a′0. The second and third cases
occur under the condition bc > d2, when iC may exist. Here, if a0 is close to 0, then diDe = biCc = 1, so S1
is the only locally stable strategy for small a0. When the chance of surviving alone is very small, cooperation
will be advantageous except in the final step of the game. As a0 increases, both iC and iD increase without
bound, but with different consequences depending on whether a′′0 < a
′
0 or a
′′
0 > a
′
0.
The latter two cases differ owing to the different rates of increase of the two boundaries diDe and biCc
as a0 increases. For simplicity, let us focus on the continuous interval [iD, iC ] which has length iC − iD.
We again treat n implicitly, knowing that the picture will look different depending on whether n < iD,
iD < n < iC or n > iC . If a
′′
0 < a
′
0, then iC diverges before iD and iC − iD will increase as a0 increases.
If a′′0 > a
′
0, then iD diverges before iC and iC − iD will decrease as a0 increases. In this case of shrinking
iC − iD, since diDe = biCc = 1 when a0 is close to 0 there will be at most one locally stable state, which will
exist over values of a0 for which [iD, iC ] contains an integer. Local stability becomes impossible when a0 is
large enough that diDe exceeds biCc.
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Figure 7: In orange, iC for a given a0 is the point above which an additional round of cooperation is favored. In blue, iD for
a given a0 is the point below which an additional round of defection is favored. The game parameters are a = 0.97, b = 0.93,
c = 0.98, d = 0.95, which are related to those used previous, e.g. in in Fig. 5, by subtracting 0.01 from b and c which makes
a′′0 < a
′
0 while keeping bc > d
2. For any given a0, the stretch of locally stable states spans vertically between the two lines,
where increased cooperation and increased defection are both disfavored.
Figure 7 illustrates the case where a′′0 < a
′
0, so that iC diverges before iD. A graphical proof shows that
the stretch of equilibria grows with a0 in this case. Assume some k > 0. Then
iC = iD + k + 1⇔
(
d2
a0
)k
=
1 + d−bbc−d2
a0−d2
a0−d
1 + c−aa2−bc
a0−d2
a0−d
. (54)
As shown in Fig. 8, graphing the two sides of the right-hand equality in (54) as functions of a0 shows that
the two curves intersect at a0 = d
2 regardless of k. This point anchors all the curves, though it is not a
permissible solution of (54) because (54) was derived assuming d2 6= a0. For any given k, the two curves
intersect again at another a0 which is the solution of (54) and which increases with k. We call this value
a0(k). Then for k1 > k2 > 0,
a0 ≤ d2 ⇒
(
d2
a0
)k1
≥
(
d2
a0
)k2
(55)
so we have a0(k2) ≤ d2 ⇒ a0(k1) ≥ a0(k2) and a0(k2) > d2 ⇒ a0(k1) > d2. Further,
a0 > d
2 ⇒
(
d2
a0
)k1
<
(
d2
a0
)k2
(56)
so a0(k2) > d
2 ⇒ a0(k1) > a0(k2). Therefore a0(k) is an increasing function, which means that the bigger
the difference between iC and iD is, the bigger a0 has to be. This proves that the length of the equilibrium
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stretch iC − iD increases with a0, approaching infinite length as a0 approaches a′′0 . When a′′0 < a0 < a′0 the
situation is like the first case, d2 ≥ bc which also has infinite iC , and the interval of equilibria [diDe, n] will
shrink until it disappears when a0 ≥ a′0.
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Figure 8: Solving (54) graphically means finding the intersections of the colored curves y =
(
d2
a0
)k
for different values of k and
the single black curve y =
(
1 + d−b
bc−d2
a0−d2
a0−d
)(
1 + c−a
a2−bc
a0−d2
a0−d
)−1
. The parameters are a = 0.97, b = 0.93, c = 0.98, d = 0.95
as in Fig. 7. All curves intersect when a0 = d2, which is close to a′′0 in this case and marked by the thin vertical line.
Thus, with the cap at n, the stretch of locally stable equilibria [diDe, biCc] increases in length with its
two boundaries drifting towards n as a0 grows. The upper limit biCc will reach n for some a0 < a′′0 after
which the stretch of equilibria will be [diDe, n] which starts closing as the lower boundary increases with a0.
Eventually the stretch will be reduced to the single point n for some a0 < a
′
0. The stretch will disappear as
a0 approaches a
′
0, meaning that there will always be an incentive to defect once more. But since there are
only n rounds in the game, Sn will remain a stable strategy for all larger values of a0.
Using the same techniques, the opposite behavior can be shown to hold when a′0 < a
′′
0 . Specifically, the
stretch simply decreases in length, with at most one locally stable state, until it disappears at some a0 < a
′
0.
Figure 9 shows an example. For a0 larger than the point where iC and iD cross, no stretch of locally stable
equilibria can exist. As long as n is large enough, there will be three zones: for small i there will only be
an incentive to defect more, for intermediate i increased defection and increased cooperation will both be
favored over keeping the same strategy, and for large i there will only be an incentive to cooperate more.
These three zones will drift towards larger i so that eventually for some a0 < a
′′
0 there will only be an
advantage to defect one more time. Then only Sn will remain a stable strategy.
4.2.3. Summary and interpretation of cases
Our analyses in the previous two sections (4.2.1 and 4.2.2) establish that when neither iD nor iC exists,
there is an incentive to defect one more time against a partner with strategy Si regardless of i. When iD exists,
additional defections are favored if i < iD but disfavored if i > iD. When iC exists, additional cooperations
are disfavored if i < iC but favored if i > iC . We focused on the possibility of a non-empty stretch of
local equilibria [diDe, biCc] existing when i > iD and i < iC . In addition, we described the possibility of
a stretch of what we may call ‘disequilibria’, where increased defection and increased cooperation are both
favored. For both kinds of stretches, we established that when i is outside the stretch there is incentive to
move toward it by increasing the number of defections if i < iD and increasing the number of cooperations if
i > iC . Here we point out another possibility, that neither kind of stretch exists, namely when biDc = biCc
so that increased defection is favored if i ≤ biCc and increased cooperation is favored if i ≥ biCc+ 1.
Table 2 provides further detail and specifies parameter ranges for each case. Among the ten possibilities
listed in Table 2, there are a total of six cases which may be described in terms of the loner survival
probability, a0, roughly as follows. One case holds for large a0, such that additional defections are favored
regardless of i. Two cases hold for small a0, such that a stretch of local equilibria is possible which may
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Figure 9: As in Fig. 7, for a given a0, iC (orange) is the point above which an additional round of cooperation is favored
and iD (blue) is the point below which an additional round of defection is favored. The stretch between iD and iC shrinks
as a0 increases. After the curves cross, the vertical span between iC and iD is the interval where both cooperating more and
defecting more are better than keeping one’s strategy. The curve for iD is identical to the one plotted in Fig. 5 because the
same parameters are used here: a = 0.97, b = 0.94, c = 0.99, d = 0.95.
either be capped by n regardless of how large n is or may be capped by biCc. However, stretches of equilibria
are irrelevant if the game is too short (n < diDe). Two more cases hold for some intermediate a0, such that
a stretch of local disequilibria is possible which may be capped by n or by biDc, but is irrelevant if the game
is too short (n < diCe). These intermediate values of a0 occur when a0 is larger than the value for which
iD = iC , which is possible only when bc > d
2 and a′0 < a
′′
0 . We might call this value a
′′′
0 and for reference
give its formula,
a′′′0 =
bd(c− d)(a2 − bc)
(a2 − bc + c− a)(bc− d2) , (57)
which may be obtained using (43) and (51). For example, a′′′0 ≈ 0.43 using the parameters of Fig. 9. However,
the classification of cases for a0 near a
′′′
0 is complicated because it depends on biDc and biCc, not simply on
iD and iC . An additional, sixth case occurs in this region, when biDc = biCc such that additional defection
is favored if i ≤ biDc and additional cooperation is favored if i ≥ diDe = diCe. Again using the parameters
of Fig. 9, we have biDc = biCc = 1 for a0 ∈ (0.323, 0.547).
Following the discussion of Fig. 1 in Section 2, we interpret the possibilities outlined in Table 2 as a balance
between individual survival and pair survival. The first major division of Table 2 has already been discussed.
It is based on the assumption that the order of eigenvalues is a2 > d2 ≥ bc, with a0 falling somewhere between
0 and 1. Here an additional round of cooperation does not benefit the individual (a − c < 0) or the pair
(bc−d2 ≤ 0). Thus the only criterion for stable states is whether additional defections remain favored. They
are favored for small i but become disfavored at some larger value of i = diDe which increases with a0. For
a0 ≥ a′0 the extent covers all integers and none of the Si are stable.
In the second and third major divisions of Table 2, i.e. when a2 > bc > d2, the interval of locally stable
states is finite and shifts toward larger integers as a0 increases (cf. Fig. 7 and Fig. 9). As it shifts, its width
is either shrinking or extending depending whether a′0 < a
′′
0 , so that iD diverges first as in Fig. 9, or a
′
0 > a
′′
0 ,
so that iC diverges first as in Fig. 7. Putting this in terms of individual versus pair survival, we have
a′0 < a
′′
0 ⇔
a2 − bc
c− a + a2 − bc <
bc− d2
d− b + bc− d2
⇔ (a2 − bc)(d− b) < (bc− d2)(c− a)
⇔ a
2 − bc
c− a <
bc− d2
d− b . (58)
Thus, a shrinking stretch of equilibria can occur when the cost to pair survival of an additional defection is
small (a2 − bc ' 0). Then there would not be a big drawback to defecting once more which might outweigh
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bc ≤ d2
a0 ≥ a′0 additional defection always favored
a0 < a
′
0 possible stretch of equilibria [diDe, n]
bc > d2 and a′0 ≥ a′′0
a0 ≥ a′0 additional defection always favored
a′′0 ≤ a0 < a′0 possible stretch of equilibria [diDe, n]
a0 < a
′′
0 possible stretch of equilibria [diDe, biCc]
bc > d2 and a′0 < a
′′
0
a0 ≥ a′′0 additional defection always favored
a′0 ≤ a0 < a′′0 possible stretch of disequilibria [diCe, n]
a0 < a
′
0 and biDc > biCc possible stretch of disequilibria [diCe, biDc]
a0 < a
′
0 and biDc = biCc incentives switch between biDc and diDe
a0 < a
′
0 and biDc < biCc single equilibrium point diDe = biCc
Table 2: Parameter regions—determined in large part by the relative magnitude of the loner survival probability a0—which
produce different incentives for an individual with strategy Si to either cooperate once more, defect once more, either or neither,
against a partner with the same strategy Si. It is assumed in all cases that c > a > d > b and a
2 > bc. In the second-to-last
line, the incentives switch from favoring additional defection if i ≤ biDc to favoring additional cooperation if i ≥ diDe = diCe.
the benefit to individual survival (c − a). Opposition to additional defection would come mainly from the
cost of having to survive alone. Larger a0 would decrease this cost and the lower bound of the stretch of
equilibria (iD) would depend strongly on a0. A shrinking stretch of equilibria can also occur when the cost
of additional cooperation is small (d−b ' 0). Then additional cooperation would not cost much individually
and would help the pair (bc − d2), so a big increase in a0 would be needed to make further cooperation
unattractive, causing the upper bound (iC) of the stretch of equilibria to grow slowly with a0. Note that
these are the same reasons why there might be a stretch of unstable Si. For the case a
′
0 > a
′′
0 , we would have
a similar interpretation of an extending stretch of equilibria, but in terms of bc ' d2 or c ' a.
4.2.4. A word about local evolutionarily stable strategies
We have shown that long stretches of locally stable strategies are possible. For example, taking the
parameters in Fig. 7 (a = 0.97, b = 0.9, c = 0.99, d = 0.94) and setting a0 = 0.9 gives [diDe, n] = [10, n] for
a game of any length n ≥ 10. But which if any of these might be local ESSs? Equation (33) specifies the
additional conditions for Si to be a local ESS, from which we infer
A(Si;Si+1) > A(Si+1;Si+1)⇔ i + 1 > iC (59)
A(Si;Si−1) > A(Si−1;Si−1)⇔ i− 1 < iD. (60)
Therefore
i is a local ESS ⇔ i ∈ ]max(iD, iC − 1),min(iD + 1, iC)[
⇔ i is the only stable state. (61)
When there is just one locally stable strategy, it is also a local ESS and vice versa. Note that n may be the
only stable state because it is the cap, e.g. n = 10 in the example just given. Otherwise, single stable states
occur when bc > d2 and a0 is not too large (Table 2). Again, ESS is a population concept. The implication
of (61) is that, even when a long stretch of locally stable strategies exists, a population fixed for a locally
stable strategy which is not an ESS is susceptible to invasion by a neighboring strategy.
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5. Global properties of A(Sj;Si)
Here we return to the payoff matrix A(Sj ;Si) for all i, j ∈ [0, n], given by (12) for j ≥ i and by (13)
for j ≤ i. To recap: in Section 3 we fixed i = 0 and asked whether an optimal response j = Jopt existed,
and in Section 4 we focused on j = i and considered in detail the neighboring states where j and i differ
by 1. These findings, in particular about Jopt, iD and iC , retain their importance in this section, where we
study the full payoff matrix A(Sj ;Si). In the subsections which follow, we investigate the global stability of
locally stable strategies, show how A(Si;Si) depends on i, ascertain key features of a best-response walk on
the surface A(Sj ;Si), and extend our findings about evolutionary stability. As above—again following (18)
and (19)—we continue to assume that the single-step game is a Prisoner’s Dilemma.
5.1. Global versus local stability
Global stability is defined as follows:
Si is a global equilibrium⇔ ∀j 6= i A(Si;Si) > A(Sj ;Si). (62)
This, again, is in the sense of a strict Nash equilibrium. A globally stable state is obviously a locally stable
one. We will prove that the reciprocal is true. We consider strategies which either defect k more times or
cooperate k more times, compared to a locally stable strategy Si. From (12) and (13) we have
A(Si+k;Si) = a
2(n−i−k)(bc)kd2i + a(1− a)ai+k0
an−i−k0 − a2(n−i−k)
a0 − a2
+ c(1− b)a2(n−i−k)ai0
ak0 − (bc)k
a0 − bc + d(1− d)a
2(n−i−k)(bc)k
ai0 − d2i
a0 − d2 (63)
A(Si−k;Si) = a2(n−i)(bc)kd2(i−k) + a(1− a)ai0
an−i0 − a2(n−i)
a0 − a2
+ b(1− c)a2(n−i)ai−k0
ak0 − (bc)k
a0 − bc + d(1− d)a
2(n−i)(bc)k
ai−k0 − d2(i−k)
a0 − d2 . (64)
From the assumption that the single-step game is a Prisoner’s Dilemma, we have c > a > d > b and a2 > bc.
Since we assume Si is locally stable, we also have A(Si+1;Si) < A(Si;Si) and A(Si−1;Si) < A(Si;Si).
We begin with the case of increasing cooperation. Specifically, we compare the difference in payoff of
two individuals, one who cooperates k additional times and one who cooperates k− 1 additional times, both
having a partner with strategy Si. Using (64) and simplifying, we have
A(Si−k;Si)−A(Si−k+1;Si) = a2(n−i)(bc)k−1d2(i−k)
[
(bc− d2) a0 − d
a0 − d2
+
(
b− d− (bc− d2) a0 − d
a0 − d2
)(a0
d2
)i−k]
. (65)
Here k ranges from 1 to i. Equation (65) is negative when k = 1, due to local stability, and will change sign
at most once as k increases from 1 to i. We need only check the endpoint, k = i, where we find
A(S0;Si)−A(S1;Si) = a2(n−i)(bc)i−1(b− d) < 0. (66)
Therefore, no additional number of cooperations is favorable against a locally stable strategy.
In the case of increasing defection, we compare the payoff of an individual who defects k + 1 times to
that of individual who defects k times, against a partner with strategy Si. Here k ranges from 0 to n − 1,
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but because n may take any value greater than or equal to one we must consider all k ≥ 0. Using (63) and
simplifying, we may write this difference as
A(Si+k+1;Si)−A(Si+k;Si) = a2(n−i−k−1)ai0(bc)k
[
H + (c− a + a2 − bc)a0 − a
∗
0
a0 − bc
(a0
bc
)k]
(67)
in which a∗0 is the cutoff given by (20), which was derived in the consideration of an optimal number of
defections against a partner with strategy S0, and
H = (a2 − bc)
(
c(1− b)
a0 − bc −
d(1− d)
a0 − d2 −
a0 − d
a0 − d2
(
d2
a0
)i)
, (68)
which does not depend on k. Local stability means that (67) is negative when k = 0. If it remains negative
for all k > 0, then no additional defections will be favored against a partner with strategy Si. This will
depend on the comparison of H and the second term inside the brackets in (67). If a0 < bc, this second
term is positive, so from k = 0 we know H must be negative. Also, the second term will shrink to zero as k
increases because a0/bc < 1. Therefore, the whole of (67) remains negative for all k if a0 < bc. Alternatively,
if bc < a0 < a
∗
0, then the second term in (67) is negative and increases in absolute value as k increases.
Here too (67) remains negative for all k. We do not need to consider a0 > a
∗
0 because local stability requires
a0 < a
′
0 and we have a
′
0 ≤ a∗0. Thus, we have shown that if Si is locally stable, there is no increased number
of defections which is better.
Taking both cases together, we have proven that locally stable states and globally stable states are the
same. For brevity, we have omitted the detailed treatments of special cases, such as a0 = a
2, and simply
note that these do not alter our conclusion. In sum, globally stable states form the same intervals as locally
stable states we described previously in Section 4.2.2. This extension from the local to the global perspective
does not necessarily work for an ESS, as we discuss in Section 5.4.
5.2. The diagonal A(Si;Si)
Although potentially long stretches of local equilibria may exist, not all A(Si;Si) are equivalent. In the
single-step survival game or in the usual Prisoner’s Dilemma with a > d, C is a better choice than D if both
players take the same strategy. Here we interested in whether S0 is the best strategy in this sense in the
n-step game. We base our analysis on the one-step difference
A(Si+1;Si+1)−A(Si;Si) = a2(n−i−1)
[
(d2 − a2) a0 − d
a0 − d2 d
2i +
(
(a2 − d2) a0 − d
a0 − d2 + d− a
)
ai0
]
(69)
= a2(n−i−1)ai0(d− a)
[
1 + (a + d)
a0 − d
a0 − d2
((
d2
a0
)i
− 1
)]
. (70)
For the smallest i we have
A(S1;S1)−A(S0;S0) = a2(n−1)(d− a) < 0. (71)
The difference A(Si+1;Si+1) − A(Si;Si) will remain negative for larger i unless the second term in the
brackets in (70) becomes too large in the negative direction. Of course a + d > 0. This second term in
the brackets is a decreasing function of a0, which begins positive for 0 < a0 < d, then becomes negative
when a0 > d and continues to decrease as a0 approaches 1. It is straightforward to check that even with
a0 = 1, A(Si+1;Si+1)−A(Si;Si) in (70) is negative. Thus, A(Si;Si) is a decreasing function of i. The fully
cooperative strategy S0 is the best if both players are restricted to having the same strategy.
5.3. A best-response walk on the surface A(Sj ;Si)
To better understand the full payoff matrix A(Sj ;Si) for all i, j ∈ [0, n], we studied the best-response
dynamics of an individual who adopts a new strategy which maximizes their survival given their partner’s
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current strategy, and the partner follows suit. Alternatively, one might think of a larger population, all
members of which currently have the same strategy, and in which individuals independently formulate their
best response then all switch to that new strategy. The same procedure is repeated forever. We will assume
that the resulting walk is well defined in the sense that none of the A(Sj ;Si) are equal, considering all
j ∈ [0, n] for a given i. Because the walk is deterministic and has a finite number of possibilities (there are
exactly n + 1 states: S0, S1, . . ., Sn), it cannot be injective. Ultimately the walk will end in a cycle, which
might consist of a just one globally stable strategy.
Best-response dynamics show how individuals search for and find pure Nash equilibria when they exist
(Roughgarden, 2016). The stretches of stable strategies described in Section 4.2.2 and Section 5.1 are sets
of pure Nash equilibria. The analysis of iD and iC based on single-step changes in strategy (see Section 4.2)
shows that there is incentive to move toward such a stretch of equilibria for any partners’ or prevailing
strategies outside the stretch, by increasing defection when i ≤ biDc and by increasing cooperation when
i ≥ diCe. The same analysis shows that there is incentive to move similarly toward a stretch of disequilibria
which is not capped by n or a stretch of equilibria which is empty. Here we investigate how best-response
walks on the surface A(Sj ;Si) depend on the initial value of i, how stretches of equilibria or disequilibria
are approached from above and below in steps which may be greater than one, and how these walks either
converge on single points (i.e. pure Nash equilibria) or enter into larger cycles.
Figure 10 illustrates this for two survival games of length n = 20, one with a stretch of equilibria and
one with a stretch of disequilibria, in which each single step is a Prisoner’s Dilemma. The first (Fig. 10AC)
has a0 < a
′′
0 < a
′
0 and 0 < diDe < biCc < n and so exemplifies the fifth of the ten possibilities listed
in Table 2, with a stretch of equilibria for i ∈ [4, 15]. The second (Fig. 10BD) has a0 < a′0 < a′′0 and
0 < diCe < biDc < n and so exemplifies the eighth of the ten possibilities listed in Table 2, with a stretch of
disequilibria for i ∈ [3, 13]. Panels A and B give 3d depictions of A(Sj ;Si) as a continuous surface. Panels C
and D show the same surfaces, viewed from above, and display all possible best-response walks using arrows.
Each possible walk starts at some point on the diagonal. It follows the vertical arrow which goes either up
or down to the optimal strategy Sj against Si. Then it follows the horizontal arrow which goes back to the
diagonal. It continues in like manner, repeating the exact same procedures.
Figure 10 shows the characteristic features of walks when iD and iC exist. In particular, if i ≤ biDc the
best response is an increasing function of i, whereas if i ≥ diCe the best response does not depend on i.
When there is a stretch of equilibria, [diDe, biCc], the points on the interior are their own best responses,
and walks which begin outside the stretch converge on its endpoints, diDe from below and biCc from above.
When there is a stretch of disequilibria, [diCe, biDc], incentives to defect more send walks into the interior
then through the stretch, toward diDe, but these are opposed by incentives to cooperate more, which always
leap over the stretch, directly to biCc. In this case, walks may converge on cycles of two or more states.
We can use (65) and (67) in Section 5.1 to obtain the best responses for i ≥ diCe and i ≤ biDc, respectively.
In the first case, we put j = i− k in (65) and rewrite it for our purposes here as
A(Sj ;Si)−A(Sj+1;Si) = a2(n−i)(bc)i−j−1d2j
[
(bc− d2) a0 − d
a0 − d2
−(b− d + bc− d2)a0 − a
′′
0
a0 − d2
(a0
d2
)j]
. (72)
Now j ranges from 0 to i. We know that (72) is negative when j = 0, from (66) which holds for all i. In
addition, because here we are assuming i ≥ diCe, we know that (72) is positive when j = i. We treat j as
continuous and solve for the value which makes (72) equal to zero,
j∗ =
ln
(
bc−d2
b−d+bc−d2
a0−d
a0−a′′0
)
ln
(
a0
d2
) . (73)
Then, the best response falls in the interval (j∗, j∗ + 1) and must be equal to dj∗e. Writing (73) in this way
emphasizes that we are considering the case a0 < a
′′
0 , namely when iC exists. In fact, it is straightforward
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Figure 10: Panels A and B show two payoff surfaces, A(Sj ;Si), for a game of length n = 20. In both: a0 = 0.86. In A:
(a, b, c, d) = (0.97, 0.93, 0.98, 0.95) as in Fig. 7. In B: (a, b, c, d) = (0.97, 0.94, 0.99, 0.95) as in Fig. 9. Panels C and D show the
different possible best-response walks on the same two surfaces. In C (and A), iD = 3.08 and iD = 15.99 and there is a stretch
of equilibria for i = 4 to i = 15 which is approached from above and below. In D (and B) iC = 4.22 and iD = 13.49 and there
is a stretch of disequilibria for i = 5 to i = 13, leading in this case to a two-state cycle between i = 4 and i = 11.
to show that j∗ = iC − 1, so that dj∗e = biCc. Thus, for partner or prevailing strategies with i ≥ diCe, the
optimal strategy of an individual is to defect only in the final dj∗e = biCc steps of the game. If there is a
stretch of equilibria then dj∗e is at the upper end of the stretch, whereas if there is a stretch of disequilibria
then dj∗e is just beyond the lower end of the stretch.
In the second case, i ≤ biDc, we similarly set (67) equal to zero and solve to obtain
k∗(i) =
ln
(
−H(a0−bc)
(c−a+a2−bc)(a0−a∗0)
)
ln
(
a0
bc
) (74)
in which the dependence on i is through H, given by (68). The best response is captured by the interval
(i+ k∗(i), i+ k∗(i) + 1) and is equal to i+ dk∗(i)e. The full expression for k∗(i) is cumbersome, but for the
smallest i we have
k∗(0) =
ln
(
a2−bc
c−a+a2−bc
a0−c
a0−a?0
)
ln
(
a0
bc
) . (75)
Note that this is another route to the optimal number of defections against a fully cooperative partner
(Section 3.2) because dk∗(0)e = Jopt. For larger i, we find that k∗(i) decreases with i, finally reaching zero
for i = iD. As Fig. 10 shows, the optimal total number (i+dk∗(i)e) of end-game defections against partner or
prevailing strategies with i ≤ biDc increases with i. The largest integer-valued i which still favors increased
defection is i = biDc and this would motivate one additional defection by the individual, up to j = diDe.
If there is a stretch of equilibria, this largest value is at the lower end of the stretch, whereas if there is a
stretch of disequilibria it is just beyond the upper end of the stretch. However, in the latter case, as the
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walk moves through the stretch, it may happen as in Fig. 10D that it never reaches j = diDe and instead
turns downward because there is an even stronger incentive for additional cooperation.
The examples in Fig. 10 represent just two of the six distinct outcomes among the ten total possibilities
listed in Table 2, namely when there is either a stretch of equilibria or a stretch of disequilibria and, in these
particular examples, when n is large enough that the entire stretch is apparent within the game. Figure 11
shows three more of the six outcomes: a case in which additional defection is favored for all i (Fig. 11A), a
case in which there is a stretch of equilibria capped by n (Fig. 11B), and a case in which there is necessarily a
single equilibrium point (Fig. 11C). These are the first, fourth, and tenth of ten possibilities listed in Table 2.
The remaining outcome of the six, which is the ninth possibility in Table 2, when incentives switch between
biDc = biCc and diDe = diCe, is not depicted but will result in a cycle between those two adjacent states.
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Figure 11: Three additional examples of best-response walks on the surface A(Sj ;Si) for a game of length n = 20. In A,
(a, b, c, d) = (0.97, 0.91, 0.98, 0.95) and a0 = 0.95, so bc < d2 and a0 > a′0, and additional defection is always favored. In
B, (a, b, c, d) = (0.97, 0.93, 0.98, 0.95) and a0 = 0.92, so bc > d2 and a′′0 < a0 < a
′
0, and all i ≥ 12 are stable. In C,
(a, b, c, d) = (0.97, 0.93, 0.99, 0.949) and a0 = 0.78, so bc > d2, a0 < a′0 < a
′′
0 and biDc < biCc, and there is a single stable state
at i = 4. Thus, these correspond to the first, third and last of the ten possibilities listed in Table 2.
Our findings about k∗(i) and j∗ can be applied to all cases, separately for j ≥ i above the diagonal and
j ≤ i below the diagonal. The optimum k∗(i) is an extension of Jopt = k∗(0), with the intuitive conclusion
that if iD exists then, as the partner defects more, there is a diminishing return on additional defections
by the individual. Figure 11A shows a case when iD does not exist and there is no diminishing return on
additional defection as i increases.
In fact, there may still be a diminishing return when iD does not exist, specifically if a0 < d. But if
a0 = d as in Fig. 11A then k
∗(i) = Jopt for all i, and if a0 > d then k∗(i) increases with i. To prove these
statements, first it can be shown that
A(Si+k+1, Si)−A(Si+k, Si) = a0
a2
[A(Si+k+1, Si)−A(Si+k, Si)] + (a0 − d)(a
2 − bc)
a2
(bc)kd2i. (76)
Then, because k∗(i) = max {k > 1|A(Si+k, Si) > A(Si+k−1, Si)} = min {k > 1|A(Si+k+1, Si) < A(Si+k, Si)},
we have that k∗(i) increases with i if a0 > d, decreases if a0 < d and is constant if a0 = d. As an immediate
consequence, we have that i+ k∗(i) increases with i for a0 ≥ d. We can prove the same is true for a0 < d, in
particular for any i ≤ diDe (which we note might be infinite). We fix i ≤ diDe and use l = i + k such that
diDe > l > i. Let S(l)j be a strategy ending with j defections in a subgame of only l rounds. We have
A(Sl+1, Si+1)−A(Sl, Si+1)− [A(Sl+1, Si)−A(Sl, Si)] =
= (bc− a2)a2(n−l−1)
(
A(S
(l)
l , S
(l)
i+1)−A(S(l)l , S(l)i )
)
= (bc− a2)a2(n−l−1)
[(
A(S
(l)
l , S
(l)
l−1)−A(S(l)l−1, S(l)l−1)
)
+
(
A(S
(l)
l−1, S
(l)
l−1)−A(S(l)l , S(l)l )
)]
. (77)
The second term in the brackets in (77) is always positive thanks to the diagonal behavior described in
Section 5.2. The first term in the brackets is also positive, because l − 1 < iD, meaning there is a local
incentive to defect one more time. Note, we used the fact that iD is does not depend of the number of rounds in
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the game (l or n). To finish the proof, we further note that k∗(i) = max {k > 1|A(Si+k, Si) < A(Si+k−1, Si)}.
In sum, optimal defection steps always lead to more total defection.
The result j∗ may be even more surprising. It says that when iC exists, then for any partner strategies
with i ≥ diCe—that is, even against a partner who defects in every step of an arbitrarily long game—the
optimal strategy is to cooperate for the first n−biCc steps then defect just biCc times at the end of the game.
Whereas Jopt shows the limitation of backward induction in iterated survival games, j
∗ for the case i = n
shows the potential of forward thinking. Faced with an uninterrupted string of defections by the partner,
the individual sees the advantage of sacrificing individual survival by cooperating early in the game, if the
loner survival probability is relatively small (a0 < a
′′
0) and each additional sacrifice in individual survival
increases pair survival (bc > d2). It is interesting that this advantage extends to dj∗e = biCc which is not a
function of the length of the game or of the partner’s strategy as long as i ≥ diCe but only of the proximity
to the end of the game.
5.4. Global evolutionarily stable strategies
From Section 5.1, we know that each isolated, local ESS of Section 4.2.4 is globally stable. If it also
satisfies (33), that is if A(Si;Sj) > A(Sj ;Sj) for all j 6= i, then it is a global ESS. This additional criterion
means that, against a partner who adopts any alternative strategy, an individual who keeps the globally
stable strategy does better than an individual who adopts the alternative strategy along with the partner.
This is clearly the case in Fig. 11C, where all vertical arrows end at the same globally stable state. In
fact, this criterion will always be met for alternative strategies with larger numbers of defections, since j∗
does not depend on the partner strategy. However, it will not necessarily be met for alternative strategies
with smaller numbers of defections, in particular when the candidate ESS is strategy Sn as in Figure 11A.
Although the differences in payoff are not great for the parameters of Fig. 11A, for this example we may
verify that A(S20;S0) = 0.491 < A(S20;S0) = 0.496. We may conclude that a local ESS may be a global
ESS but it does not have to be one.
We could make Sn, or all-D, an ESS in all three examples of Fig. 11 simply by making the game shorter:
n ≤ 8 in Fig. 11A, n ≤ 6 in Fig. 11B, and n ≤ 4 in Fig. 11C. In addition, Sn will be an ESS if a0 ≥ a∗0, so
that Jopt does not exist. The latter is a special case of defection always being favored (first, third and sixth
possibilities in Table 2) in which Sn would be an ESS regardless of n. All-C, or S0, is never an ESS because
defection is always favored in the final step of the game. However, S1 will be an ESS if a0 is sufficiently small.
Finally, we may note that whereas Fig. 11C represents the tenth possibility in Table 2, in which only a single
equilibrium point is possible, an ESS for i < n may also occur in the fifth possibility in Table 2. Simply
changing d from 0.949 to 0.95 in the example of Fig. 11C moves it from the tenth to the fifth possibility in
Table 2, by making a′0 > a
′′
0 , but results in virtually the same graph with S4 as an ESS.
6. Discussion
We have established some basic properties of strategy choice in iterated, two-player survival games,
focusing especially on the case where each step is a Prisoner’s Dilemma. It would be of interest to investigate
arbitrary strategies, including mixed strategies and reactive strategies, but for simplicity we have focused on
pure, non-reactive strategies which switch from C to D at some step of the game. We have denoted these
by the number of end-of-game defections: Si means C for n − i steps then D for i steps, with i ∈ [0, n].
Thus, the state space of strategies is an (n+ 1)× (n+ 1) matrix. Our goal has been to understand how the
payoff function A(Sj ;Si), which is the survival probability of an individual with strategy Sj whose partner
has strategy Si, depends on the parameters (i, j, n, a, b, c, d, a0).
Previous studies have addressed strategy choice in iterated survival games, but only under the assumption
that an initial choice of a single-step strategy is maintained over the entire game. Eshel and Weinshall (1988)
modeled such constant, single-step strategies as probabilistic mixtures of C and D in the case that n is
geometrically distributed and (a, b, c, d) in each step is randomly sampled from a distribution which assign
non-zero probabilities to Harmony Games (a ≥ c, b ≥ d) as well as to Prisoner’s Dilemma’s (c > a > d > b);
note this is our notation not theirs. Eshel and Shaked (2001) included the possibility of non-independence
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of players’ survival in each step. Garay (2009) considered mixtures like those of Eshel and Weinshall (1988)
but in a game of fixed length and with constant single-step payoffs. Wakeley and Nowak (2019) studied the
choice between two pure, single-step strategies in a fixed-length game.
By considering the consequences of switching from C to D during the game in the case that each step is
a canonical Prisoner’s Dilemma (c > a > d > b, a2 > bc) we found three critical values (a∗0, a
′
0, a
′′
0) for the
loner survival probability a0 which establish broad patterns of incentives to cooperate or defect. If a0 < a
∗
0,
then an optimal number of defections Jopt exists against a partner who never defects (i = 0). If a0 < a
′
0,
then a switch-point iD exists such that additional defection is favored for i < iD but disfavored for i > iD. If
a0 < a
′′
0 , then a switch-point iC exists such that additional cooperation is favored for i < iC but disfavored
for i > iC . These critical values are averages, each falling between an identical-pair survival probability
and the corresponding individual survival probability: specifically between a2 and a in the case of a∗0, and
between d2 and d in the cases of a′0 and a
′′
0 . We have a
∗
0 > a
′
0, so the existence of iD guarantees the existence
of Jopt but not vice versa. Further, depending on the parameters (a, b, c, d), a
′
0 may be either larger or
smaller than a′′0 , with important consequences for the structure of incentives.
Extending the idea of Jopt to other partner strategies, we found a single optimal response j
∗ = biCc
to any partner who defects more than iC times, and a series of optimal responses i + k(i), beginning at
Jopt for i = 0 and ending at diDe for i = biDc, to a partner who defects fewer than iD times. When iD
exists, a stretch of equilibria may exist, composed of stable strategies for which there is no incentive either
to cooperate more or to defect more. The stretch extends from diDe to biCc if iC exists and diDe ≤ biCc,
or to n if iC does not exist or if diDe ≤ n ≤ biCc. Alternatively, when iC exists, a stretch of disequilibria
may exist, composed of unstable strategies for which there is incentive both to cooperate more and to defect
more. These stretches extend from diCe to biDc if iD exists and diCe ≤ biDc, or to n if iD does not exist or
if diCe ≤ n ≤ biDc. When neither iD nor iC exist or when n < iD, iC , additional defection is favored such
that the single best strategy is Sn. Other special cases occur; Table 2 lists all possibilities.
Two more general features of our model are notable. First, strategy choice depends explicitly on the
number of steps left in the game, but only incidentally on its length. The parameter n of course affects the
magnitude of the overall payoffs. But it is possible to ignore n in the describing the properties of Jopt, iD,
iC , etc., and only later bring n in as an upper bound to specify whether some of these quantities might be
irrelevant in a given game. Second, Jopt, iD and iC are all increasing functions of a0. They are J-shaped,
staring near zero for small a0 and diverging as a0 approaches the corresponding critical value. If the loner
survival probability a0 is small, the incentive to defect only arises near the end of the game. But if a0 is
close to one, the incentive to cooperate in an iterated survival game disappears completely.
Using the notion of a best-response walk, we showed that stretches of both equilibria and disequilibria
are approached from above and below. Stretches of disequilibria often lead to cycles between two or more
strategies. Walks approaching stretches of equilibria hit the endpoints but do not enter the interior. We
analyzed equilibria from the standpoint of evolutionary stability, and showed that equilibrium strategies are
not protected against invasion by other equilibrium strategies with fewer defections. For a strategy to be an
ESS it must be the only equilibrium strategy. However, the converse is not true.
The natural scale of survivability facilitates the investigation of all possible survival games. We have
delineated the possibilities for iterated survival games in which individuals may switch from C to D once
during the game, under the assumption that the single-step game is a Prisoner’s Dilemma. In many cases,
the essential structure of the Prisoner’s Dilemma is undermined upon iteration. In closing, we explore the
parameter space to gauge how broadly cooperation may be supported in these games. Table 3 shows the
fractions of times that five qualitatively different incentive structures for cooperation occurred when survival
probabilities (a, b, c, d, a0) were sampled uniformly at random under two different models.
Specifically, we binned the ten possibilities in Table 2 into five types of incentive structures. Type 1
includes the first, third and sixth possibilities. These are all cases in which additional defection is favored
(and additional cooperation disfavored) against all possible partner strategies. In other words, neither iD
nor iC exists. Figure 11A shows an example (in which Jopt does exist). Type 2 includes the second and
fourth possibilities, in which iD exists but iC doesn’t, producing a stretch of equilibria which begins at diDe
and has no upper bound except n. Figure 11B shows an example. Type 3 includes the fifth and tenth
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Models for Random Sampling
a, b, c, d ∈ (0, 1) a, b, c, d ∈ (0.9, 1)
Incentive Structure a0 ∈ (0, 1) a0 ∈ (0.7, 1)
1. defection always favored 66.59% 22.95%
2. unbounded stretch of equilibria 24.22% 30.20%
3. bounded stretch of equilibria 6.70% 25.69%
4. unbounded stretch of disequilibria 1.04% 2.31%
5. bounded stretch of disequilibria 1.45% 18.85%
Table 3: Outcomes for one million parameter sets sampled uniformly at random according to two different models, in which
the single-step game is a Prisoner’s Dilemma (c > a > d > b and a2 > bc).
possibilities, in which both iD and iC exist and there a stretch of equilibria from diDe to biCc. Figure 10AC
and Fig. 11C show examples. Type 4 includes just the seventh possibility, in which iC exists but iD doesn’t,
producing a stretch of disequilibria which begins at diCe and has no upper bound except n. We have not
depicted this case, but note that it leads to multi-state cycles in best-response walks. Type 5 includes the
eighth and ninth possibilities, in which both iD and iC exist and either there is a stretch of disequilibria
from diCe to biDc or there are no integers between iD and iC . Figure 10BD shows an example of the former.
The latter leads to cycles between two adjacent states (not shown).
We considered two different ranges of survival probabilities as models for random sampling. The first
model samples uniformly over the entire parameter space. This covers all possible iterated survival games,
including many cases when there is no advantage at all to having a partner (a0 > a, b, c, d). The second model
samples over two narrower ranges, 0.9 to 1 for a, b, c and d, and 0.7 to 1 for a0. This captures the range
of examples we have presented in this work. Sampling a, b, c, d > 0.9 represents games which are, arguably,
relatively mild in a single step but may become very harsh upon iteration. The resulting single-step pairwise
survival probabilities, a2, bc and d2, will all be greater than 0.8. Sampling a0 > 0.7 then covers a range of
models with relatively bleak prospects for loners, which should favor cooperation, but also allows that a0
might be comparable in magnitude to, or even greater than a, b, c and d.
We took one million random samples of parameters for each model. We assigned parameter labels such
that c > a > d > b, then excluded samples which did not satisfy a2 > bc. This excluded about 10%
of samples in the first model and about 24% in the second model. We checked the remaining samples
against the criteria in Table 2, then binned them into the five qualitatively different incentive structures and
computed the percentages of samples falling under each type of structure.
Table 3 illustrates the ways in which cooperation can be favored in iterated survival games, in terms of
fractions of the parameter space. For the first model, which samples over all possible parameters a, b, c, d, a0 ∈
(0, 1), about two-thirds of parameter sets yield games in which additional defection is favored against any
partner strategy. Most of the other one-third of the parameter space corresponds to games with an unbounded
stretch of equilibria. Games with stretches of disequilibria are rare. Given that the single-step game is a
Prisoner’s Dilemma, cooperation may be said to be favored whenever equilibria or disequilibria exists, at
least in the sense of there being checks on the number of end-game defections.
In fact, due to the shapes of iD and iC as functions of a0, which remain relatively small until diverging
sharply as a0 approaches a
′
0 and a
′′
0 , there are essentially two kinds of games. On the one hand, if a0 ≥ a′0, a′′0 ,
defection is clearly favored. On the other hand, if a0 < a
′
0 or a0 < a
′′
0 , there are strong checks on defection.
Across all cases in which iD or iC exists in Table 3, the median iD was 0.3 and the 90th percentile iD was
2.0. The median iC was 1.6 and the 90th percentile iC was 4.6. We might also point out that in the case
of an unbounded stretch of equilibria, the results in Section 5.2 show that none of the equilibrium strategies
are protected against invasion by strategies with smaller numbers of defections.
As expected for the second model, with a, b, c, d ∈ (0.9, 1) and a0 ∈ (0.7, 1), cooperation is favored over
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a larger fraction of the sampled parameter space. Defection is favored in less than one-quarter of games.
Bounded stretches of equilibria or disequilibria are more frequent. Unbounded stretches of disequilibria
remain rare, which makes sense because this requires that a0 falls between a
′
0 and a
′′
0 . Even over the
restricted parameter space of this sampling model, there is a dramatic difference between games in which
defection is always favored and games in which cooperation is favored in the sense of there being checks on
the number of end-game defections. Here, across all cases in which iD or iC exists, the median iD was 2.4 and
the 90th percentile iD was 16.8; the median iC was 4.5 and the 90th percentile iD was 22.5. Overall, using
this sampling model or the previous one to frame the results of Sections 3 through 5, we find surprisingly
strong support for cooperation in iterated survival games, mediated by the loner survival probability.
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